Blame it on Brussels: EU Law and the Distributive Effects of Globalisation by Tamara Perišin & Sam Koplewicz
VII
Editorial note
Tamara Perišin * and Sam Koplewicz **
BLAME IT ON BRUSSELS: EU LAW AND THE 
DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF GLOBALISATION ***
1 Introduction
Over recent years, or even decades, issues such as globalisation, 
technology, globalised wars, migration, or Brexit have accentuated two 
phenomena. The fi rst is the distributive effects of law and of globalisa-
tion, and the second is the inadequacies in the political processes and 
outcomes where governments get rightly or wrongly blamed. These two 
phenomena inspired the theme of the 16th annual Jean Monnet seminar 
on advanced issues of EU law (Inter University Centre, Dubrovnik, April 
2018) titled ‘Blame It on Brussels: EU Law and the Distributive Effects of 
Globalisation’. This editorial note is based on the authors’ keynote dia-
logue at the opening of the seminar and seeks to discuss the mentioned 
two phenomena, and consider what law and governments, and in partic-
ular the EU, can do about them.
2 Distributive effects of EU law and of globalisation
For the purposes of this paper, we can observe two main types of 
economic inequality. The fi rst is global economic inequality between the 
population of different countries, and the second is economic inequality 
within a single country. In the EU context, there are in fact three per-
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spectives: inequality between EU citizens and third country nationals, 
inequality between the EU centre and its periphery, and inequality with-
in a single Member State. The fi rst will be discussed in the part below 
on global inequality (part 2.1), while the latter two will be considered 
together in the section on internal inequality (part 2.2).
1.1 Global inequality
Concerning global inequality, it is well known that there is a gap in 
the level of wealth of rich and poor countries. This is sometimes incor-
rectly seen as some natural phenomenon that results from thousands 
of years of history and that cannot be undone by regulation. We are 
not denying that the reasons for the global wealth gap are multifaceted 
and include diverse climate conditions, natural disasters, distant histor-
ic developments, etc. However, we want to highlight that contemporary 
governmental actions and laws, including those of the European Union, 
are not neutral to this. 
For example, it is common knowledge that the European Union is 
a regional trading block where there are no internal customs duties be-
tween Member States, but that there are customs duties on goods com-
ing from third countries. This set-up creates trade diversion, as a less 
competitive producer from within the block is favoured over a more com-
petitive producer from outside the block.1 Similarly, the EU’s subsidies 
for agriculture are harmful for agricultural producers from third coun-
tries interested in exporting their agricultural products to the EU. Both 
features of EU regulation affect producers, particularly those from less 
developed countries which are not able to offer comparable subsidies 
themselves. It is true that the EU is not the only player with customs du-
ties or subsidies that restrict external trade, and there are a number of 
reasons for keeping these measures in place (eg greater bargaining power 
in the World Trade Organization, social peace in the Member States, etc). 
However, one has to be mindful that EU measures affect global inequal-
ity. It is important to consider this not only when contemplating whether 
to remove some of the existing rules, but also when adopting new ones. 
For example, bilateral treaties such as the Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the United States could 
widen the world gap as they would create an even bigger and wealthier 
trading block leading to more trade diversion, hitting competitive pro-
ducers from outside the block. 
1  Some of the features of the EU internal market also contribute to the creation of trade, 
eg mutual recognition and minimum harmonisation, as they are also benefi cial for third 
country goods.
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In addition to being a regional trading block, the EU is a developed 
single market where EU citizens (de iure insiders) move freely within 
the EU, exercising a number of fundamental freedoms and citizenship 
rights, while those without EU citizenship (de iure outsiders) are subject 
to a different set of EU rules regulating various categories of third coun-
try nationals (TCN). This difference in treatment was accentuated by the 
migration crisis, and the EU makes choices on how to deal with that. 
This editorial note will not go into the details of legislative, political doc-
uments or cases on asylum seekers. Instead, let us briefl y address two 
underlying assumptions behind the purpose of the EU and the purpose 
of law. 
The classic narrative of European integration starts with Schuman’s 
Declaration and explains how Schuman wanted to ensure future peace 
in Europe.2 It expounds that his idea was that European states, partic-
ularly Germany and France, would start cooperating in the fi eld of coal 
and steel, then in wider fi elds of economic integration, and that this eco-
nomic cooperation would eventually spill over into other, non-econom-
ic areas, all the while making states so interconnected and dependent 
on one another that war between them would be inconceivable. How-
ever, this well-known narrative omits to mention an important part of 
Schuman’s idea. Schuman does not speak of ‘European peace’, but in-
stead his Declaration opens with the words ‘[w]orld peace’.3 And many 
parts of the Declaration are really about the contribution that Europe 
should be making to the whole of human civilisation, and in particular 
to the development of Africa.4 We are not trying to build a Scalia-type 
originalist argument so as to put forward that the Treaties must be in-
terpreted in the way Europe’s founding fathers envisaged them, but we 
do want to show that the idea has never been that of creating a fortress 
Europe, but of building global wellbeing and peace. 
And we want to pair this idea with the purpose of law, and here we 
fi nd Duncan Kennedy’s critique of rights useful in this respect.5 In sim-
ple terms, the critique of rights explains how rights are a formal concept 
that can prevent the delivery of justice. In a rights-based society, law 
and justice are different things. There is a formal distinction between 
those to whom the legal system recognises rights and those who do not 
have such recognised rights. This is true both of individual and collec-
2  Declaration by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950.
3  ibid.
4  ibid.
5  D Kennedy, ‘The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies’ in W Brown and J Halley 
(eds), Left Legalism/Left Critique (Duke University Press 2002) 214 <http://duncanken-
nedy.net/documents/The%20Critique%20of%20Rights%20in%20cls.pdf> accessed 1 No-
vember 2018.
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tive rights, as both are constructed in opposition to those not having 
those rights. In this rights-based system, individualism has precedence 
over altruism, and the absence of rights serves to explain injustice. In 
the context of EU law, it is understood that EU citizens have rights of a 
‘constitutional’ nature to enter within the EU and move around freely, 
while third country nationals typically do not have such rights (unless 
they derive the rights from a certain family tie to an EU citizen6). Even 
some of the most fundamental rights cannot be of much help to outsid-
ers because rights are, as Tushnet points out, typically constructed as 
a negative obligation.7 For example, the right to life embodied in Article 
2 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights,8 in many national constitu-
tions,9 and in the European Convention on Human Rights,10 prohibits 
the Member States and the EU from killing someone, but this right does 
not in any way create an obligation of the Member States or the EU to 
save a person drowning in the Mediterranean. According to Kennedy, a 
radical proposal can more easily be imagined if one puts aside the rights 
discourse.11 So, thinking beyond rights is useful for making space for law 
and governments to improve global equality.
Let us also say that discussing only the issue of migrants or even 
the broader question of global inequality in isolation from the issue of 
internal inequality is a trap. Alexander Somek has argued that the pro-
gressives have embraced migration because 
from their perspective, migrants seem to have  assumed  the  role  left 
vacant  after  the  demise  of  the industrial proletariat… migrants 
count as the last class of history. Immigration is considered to be im-
portant, for it will give rise to a universally inclusive society.12 
However, Somek points out that actually ‘migration reconfi rms 
bourgeois values.  Migrants pursue their private self-interest’.13 In his 
6  Eg Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano ECLI:EU:C:2011:124.
7  Mark Tushnet, Essay on Rights (1984) 62 Texas Law Review, 1363, 1392. 
8  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2007] OJ C303/01, Art 2. 
9  Eg Art 2(2) Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 23.05.1949 − ‘Jeder hat 
das Recht auf Leben und körperliche Unversehrtheit” [Art 2(2) of the German Basic Law, 23 
May 1949 − ‘Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity’].
10  European Convention on Human Rights, Art 2.  
11  See, eg, Duncan Kennedy, ‘Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy’, in D Kairys (ed), 
The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (3rd edn, Basic Books 1998) 62, where Kennedy 
states that the ‘rights discourse is a trap’, and that ‘[t]his framework is, in itself, a part of 
the problem rather than of the solution… [since i]t makes it diffi cult even to conceptualize 
radical proposals’ <http://duncankennedy.net/documents/Legal%20Education%20as%20
Training%20for%20Hierarchy_Politics%20of%20Law.pdf> accessed 17 December 2018. 
12  Alexander Somek, ‘Four Impious Points on Brexit’ (2016) 17 German Law Journal 106.
13  ibid. 
XI
view, ‘the connection between migration and social progress is at best a 
weak one’.14 We cannot engage here with the whole of Somek’s argument, 
but we do agree that we have to internally build a more equal society in 
order to be able to help others on the other side of the border. 
2.2 Internal inequality
Within economic systems, there have always been and will always 
be insiders and outsiders − winners− and losers. However, we must note 
that today the difference between these economic classes is greater than 
it has been for some time. Within the EU Member States, income in-
equality nearly doubled on average from 1988 to 2016.15 In the United 
States, income inequality is reaching levels that have not been seen since 
the 1920s − just before the Great Depression.16 
According to Branko MilanoviÊ, formerly a lead economist at the 
World Bank, the biggest winners in the last three decades have been the 
very top of the income earners and the emerging global middle class.17 
This global middle class, between the 50th and 60th percentile of income 
earners, consists of some 270 million Chinese, 40 million Indians, 35 
million Indonesians, and about 20 million people each from Brazil, Egypt 
and Mexico.18 However, the middle classes of the high-income countries, 
those between the 80th and 95th percentiles, have experienced stag-
nant incomes.19 This rift between the very rich and the middle class in 
high-income countries, combined with economic growth in lower-income 
countries, has caused many to point to globalisation to account for these 
shifts. Accordingly, recent political movements have capitalised on this 
sentiment. However, the income inequality that the middle classes of 
high-income countries are experiencing is not due solely to globalisation 
and cannot be cured with strict protectionist measures. 
The last time economic inequality reached these levels there were 
also major technological advancements resulting in economic changes − 
14  ibid. 
15  Zsolt Darvas, ‘This Is the State of Inequality in Europe’ (2018) World Economic Fo-
rum, 4 May 2018 <www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/european-income-inequality-be-
gins-to-fall-once-again> accessed 17 December 2018.
16  Hannah Shaw, ‘Exploring Income Inequality, Part 5: The Concentration of Income and 
Wealth’ (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2 December 2011) <www.cbpp.org/blog/
exploring-income-inequality-part-5-the-concentration-of-income-and-wealth> accessed 17 
December 2018.
17  Branko MilanoviÊ, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2018).
18  ibid. 
19  ibid.
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the industrial revolution.20 Similar to today, technological advances of the 
time brought the global economy closer together, but they also brought 
machines, manufacturing and, most importantly, factories.21 The result 
was industries that could produce more with fewer people. The technolog-
ical changes meant a shift in what skills were favoured, as well as where 
geographically human manpower was needed.22 People left their agricul-
tural way of life and moved to cramped, poorly constructed homes near 
factories in the cities.23 While some of the very poor may have benefi ted 
from this, it simultaneously reduced the wealth and importance of the 
petite bourgeoisie, the economic class that could pay for labour, but never 
controlled the means of production.24 At the same time, the wealthy cap-
ital holders, the haute bourgeoisie, benefi ted signifi cantly.25 
While England was experiencing its most signifi cant growth in GDP 
thanks to the industrial revolution, it simultaneously saw a spike in its 
Gini coeffi cient, an indicator of wealth inequality, from 0.4 in 1823 to 0.63 
in 1871.26 As of 2011, only four countries had greater income inequality 
than that of England in the 1870s.27 The income inequality gap peaked 
in the 1920s.28 These trends were common among other western econo-
mies that experienced the boon of the industrial revolution. In time, the 
world saw signifi cant increases in taxation, government spending and 
regulation (in some cases, turning to isolationist policies) that aimed at 
and eventually narrowed the Gini coeffi cient in many western countries 
across the world by the early to mid-20th century.29 The era was marked 
with social and political upheaval such as political revolutions, the Great 
Depression, and two world wars. 
Similarly today, the technological advancements of the digital revo-
lution have also been associated with massive shifts in the economy. Im-
provements in production, digitisation, automation, and other technolog-
20  Shaw (n 16).
21  Eric Hopkins, Industrialization and Society (Routledge 2000) 2.
22  Population Reference Bureau, ‘Human Population: Urbanization’, Archived 26 October 
2009 at the Wayback Machine.
23  ibid.
24  Frank Bechhofer and Brian Elliott, ‘Persistence and Change: The Petite Bourgeoisie in 
Industrial Society’ (1976) 17(1) European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de 
Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie 74.
25  Shaw (n 16).
26  ‘As You Were’ The Economist (London, 13 October 2012) <www.economist.com/spe-
cial-report/2012/10/13/as-you-were> accessed 17 December 2018.
27  Kevin Lincoln, ‘The 39 Most Unequal Countries in the World’ (Business Insider, 6 Octo-
ber 2011 <www.businessinsider.com/most-unequal-countries-in-the-world-2011-10>.
28  Shaw (n 16) 
29  ‘As You Were’ (n 26).
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ical advances have signifi cantly improved productivity. For example, in 
the US, the manufacturing sector’s productivity has nearly tripled since 
1980, but over the same period employment in the sector plunged from 
18.9 million jobs to 12.2 million.30 The Boston Consulting Group reports 
that it costs barely $8 an hour to use a robot for spot welding in the auto 
industry, compared to $25 for a worker, and this gap will only widen as 
technology improves.31 Due to digitisation, industries such as the media 
sector have brought the marginal cost − the cost added by producing one 
additional unit of a product or service − to nearly zero. A March 2018 
study by the consultancy fi rm PwC stated, ‘Due to automation and AI... 
30% of jobs in Britain were potentially under threat’.32 In wholesale and 
retailing − the sector that employs most people in the UK − 2.25 million 
jobs are at high risk of being lost.33   
The recent acceleration of technological advancements has certainly 
brought the world economy closer, but it has also been a major driver 
in the economic shift we have seen in the last three decades. In his 
2017 farewell speech, President Obama warned that the ‘next wave of 
economic dislocations won’t come from overseas. It will come from the 
relentless pace of automation that makes a lot of good middle-class jobs 
obsolete’.34 These advancements mean that current and coming changes 
to the economy cannot be prevented by only protectionist policies. 
To turn back to the EU context, there is fi rstly inequality between 
EU Member States, typically referred to as states of the centre and those 
of the periphery. Daniela Caruso35 and Damjan Kukovec36 explain how 
30  Mark Muro, ‘Manufacturing Jobs Aren’t Coming Back’ (MIT Technology Review, 18 No-
vember 2016) <www.technologyreview.com/s/602869/manufacturing-jobs-arent-com-
ing-back/> accessed 17 December 2018.
31  Hal Sirkin and others, ‘How Robots Will Redefi ne Competitiveness’ (Boston Consulting 
Group, 23 September 2015) <www.bcg.com/publications/2015/lean-manufacturing-inno-
vation-robots-redefi ne-competitiveness.aspx> accessed 17 December 2018.
32  John Hawksworth, Richard Berriman and Saloni Goel, Will Robots Really Steal Our 
Jobs? An International Analysis of the Potential Long Term Impact of Automation (Pricewater-
houseCoopers  2018) <www.pwc.com/hu/hu/kiadvanyok/assets/pdf/impact_of_automa-
tion_on_jobs.pdf> accessed 17 December 2018.
33  ibid. 
34  Barack Obama, ‘President Obama’s Farewell Address’ (10 January 2017) The White 
House. President Barack Obama <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/farewell> ac-
cessed 21 January 2017.
35  Daniela Caruso, ‘The “Justice Defi cit” Debate in EU Private Law: New Directions’ (23 Au-
gust 2012) Boston University School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No 12-42, 7 <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2135111> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2135111>. Here, Caruso 
took the example of the potential harmonisation of contract rules to argue how this would 
have regressive effects on some sellers, particularly those from new Member States.
36  Damjan Kukovec, ‘Economic Law, Inequality and Hidden Hierarchies on the EU Internal 
Market’ (2016) 38(1) Michigan Journal of International Law; EUI Department of Law Re-
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this is not just a consequence of the different starting positions at the 
moment of enlargement, but that EU law can actually accentuate the 
differences between Member States. Kukovec has written how EU inter-
nal market and competition law rules enable ‘goods dumping’ into the 
EU periphery which is ruining production in the periphery.37 His thesis 
is nowadays even more relevant as European institutions are gradually 
discovering that companies from the EU’s centre are not successful in 
the periphery just because consumers from the periphery are interested 
in buying their high-quality goods. Instead, these companies use the 
centre’s market power and reputation to sell lower-quality goods to the 
periphery. A European parliament report shows that producers often use 
the same product name and product code to sell two different products 
− the lower quality one is sold in the periphery, and the higher quality 
one in the centre.38 The EU fi rst ignored this issue, thinking that there 
would be no problem provided that both types of products were safe for 
consumption. However, more recently there has been some awareness 
that this might be regulated as unfair business-to-consumer commer-
cial practice39 and as unfair competition40 that affects all EU citizens, 
including when they travel to another Member State.41 
The divide between the EU’s centre and periphery can also be seen 
in relation to the issue of the movement of workers and services. The 
divide is very clearly illustrated by the legislative history of the revision 
of the Posted Workers Directive.42 To understand this divide, one has 
to go back to 2007 when the famous Laval case was decided. The case 
concerned the posting of workers from Latvia to Sweden to conduct con-
struction work. The Laval company was blocked by Swedish trade unions 
from performing its work with a view to forcing Laval to sign a collective 
agreement and to pay its workers an hourly wage calculated on the basis 
search Paper No 7 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2748559>; Damjan Kukovec, ‘Hierarchies 
as Law’ (2014) Columbia Journal of European Law, 131; Damjan Kukovec, ‘Law and the 
Periphery’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 406.
37  Eg in Kukovec, ‘Economic Law’ (n 36) 34.
38  European Parliament, Report on Dual Quality of Products in the Single Market 
(2018/2008(INI)), A8-0267/2018, 19 July 2018.
39  ibid, eg, 4, 5.
40  ibid, 4, 20.
41  ibid, 15. 
42  Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services [1997] 
OJ L18/1. The Directive was amended by Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services [2018] OJ L173/16. See 
another piece on this topic in this volume: Daniel Carter, ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work in the 
Same Place? Assessing the Revision to the Posted Workers Directive’ (2018) 14 Croatian 
Yearbook of European Law and Policy. 
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of statistics on wages for that part of Sweden.43 The Court found that 
this constituted a breach of Laval’s freedom to provide services. This 
meant that Laval was authorised to continue providing services in Swe-
den by posting Latvian workers whose rights were based on the Latvian, 
and not Swedish, collective agreement. This case was heavily criticised, 
primarily by scholars from the EU’s centre,44 since it was seen as going 
against any progressive agenda by undercutting the social standards in 
the wealthier countries and driving down labour costs to the detriment 
of workers. At the same time, the Court and scholars from the periph-
ery45 understood that this was the main way for the new Member States 
from Central and Eastern Europe to benefi t from the single market. The 
single market was about using comparative advantages, and while the 
West had comparative advantages in many sectors of the production of 
goods and services, as well as more capital, the advantage of the East 
was cheaper labour. Without this cheaper labour, the Latvian company 
Laval would probably not have won the contract for the construction 
work in Sweden and would not have been able to export its services. 
So almost a decade after this case, in 2016 the Commission pro-
posed a Revision of the Posted Workers Directive, amending, inter alia, 
rules on the remuneration of posted workers so that under the new 
scheme the receiving Member State could set certain criteria for calcu-
lating the remuneration.46 Of course, it would be wonderful for posted 
workers from the periphery if they could receive the remuneration of 
workers from the centre. However, the reality is that with that cost of 
labour, the company of the periphery would not be able to win the public 
procurement bid in the fi rst place. This is why the national parliaments 
of the periphery objected to the amendment of the directive. They used 
the powers given to national parliaments by Protocol no 2 to the Treaties 
43  Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para 30.
44  For example, for a critical comment of the case, see Ronnie Eklund, ‘A Swedish Perspec-
tive on Laval’ (2008) 29 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 551. For more nuanced 
concerns on regulatory competition, see Simon Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition after Laval’ 
(2007) 10 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 581. See also Catherine Barnard, 
‘Viking and Laval: An Introduction’ (2007) 10 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 
463, 492, where the Laval case is put in the context of a ‘battle between the economic and the 
social dimension of the EU’, while in fact it can be seen as a battle between the economy and 
social welfare (including the keeping of jobs) in Old v New Member States (although Barnard 
also rightly points out that posted workers of the new Member States are the winners).
45  See eg Damjan Kukovec, ‘A Critique of the Rhetoric of Common Interest in the EU Legal 
Discourse’ (13 April 2012) available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2178332> or <http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2178332> accessed 17 December 2018.
46  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services COM (2016) 128 fi nal, 2016/0070 (COD).
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on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
which allows national parliaments to issue reasoned opinions when they 
consider that a legislative proposal does not comply with the principle of 
subsidiarity.47 According to Article 7 of the Protocol, when reasoned opin-
ions issued by national parliaments represent at least one third of all 
the votes allocated to them, the Commission must review its proposal.48 
The example of the revision of the Posted Workers Directive is a unique 
case that showed the solidarity and common interest of the new Mem-
ber States. Their national parliaments were very coordinated and they 
managed to gather 22 negative reasoned opinions, forcing the Commis-
sion to review the proposal.49 The negative reasoned opinions came from 
nine Central and Eastern European Member States (Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia) and also from Denmark.50 The subsidiarity control mechanism 
was an imperfect way of objecting to the revision of the Posted Workers 
Directive as that mechanism can only oblige the Commission to review 
its proposal. Indeed, the Commission reviewed it, and explained why it 
was maintaining it. The proposal was eventually adopted in June 2018.51 
This example clearly shows that the divide between the centre and the 
periphery does not exist in isolation from EU law, but that EU law can 
mitigate or aggravate it. 
In addition to this inequality between citizens of different EU Mem-
ber States, there is also inequality within a single Member State, and 
again this is not unrelated to EU law. Marija Bartl has argued that the 
neo-liberal agenda has made the aim of establishment and functioning 
of the internal market incontestable, while competing aims and ideol-
ogies have caved in.52 Those who were unable to fi nd their place in the 
internal market (less educated workers, weaker consumers, the digitally 
inactive, etc) have become outsiders in the process of integration.53
The Brexit vote set off an alarm urging better public discussion on 
the benefi ts of the single market and its appropriate balance with other 
47  Protocol No 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
[2008] OJ C115/206, Art 6.
48  ibid, Art 7.
49  Communication from the Commission on the proposal for a Directive amending the 
Posting of Workers Directive, with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with 
Protocol No 2 COM (2016) 505 fi nal.
50  ibid, 3. 
51  Directive 2018/957 (n 42).
52  Marija Bartl, ‘Internal Market Rationality: In the Way of Re-imagining the Future’ (2018) 
25 European Law Journal 99.
53  ibid.
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interests. Arguably, people who voted for Brexit thought EU trade and 
free movement were to blame for many of their problems. They believed 
that by blocking the infl ow of other EU citizens, primarily those from 
Central and Eastern Europe, and by stopping the immigration of third 
country nationals, they could regain some benefi ts that once existed in 
a closed market. They, of course, did benefi t from many of the features 
of the EU set-up, including cheaper goods and services, wider consumer 
choice, etc. However, many persons, especially those with poorer edu-
cation, felt that they were not benefi ting suffi ciently as they could not 
offer their own labour on the EU market, and felt that they were even 
being deprived of work opportunities on the national market as others 
were coming to take their jobs. The problem of Brexit is that the EU 
was blamed for many things that are a consequence of technological 
advancements and globalisation, so leaving the EU will not solve the 
problem. The development of technology, including cheap and fast travel 
and the internet, has tightly connected the world. And the spread of En-
glish has made global communication so easy. Goods, services, capital 
and people move more easily across the globe than ever before. Brexit, or 
most types of protectionism, is a bad reaction to the fact that the world is 
interconnected, and will not address underlying problems,54 such as job 
losses for certain categories of workers, and growing inequality. 
Regardless of whether any inequality was caused or aggravated by 
the EU or whether it was caused by other developments, the question 
remains about what the EU should be doing to correct it. Roberto 
Unger has argued that the EU should turn itself upside down, ie that 
the market should be left to the states to experiment with, and the EU 
should focus on social rights, including education.55 According to Unger, 
‘insiders’ are those belonging to groups that can benefi t from the current 
social structure, they work in ‘the most advanced [and small] sectors of 
the economy… with innovation-friendly cooperation they have become 
responsible for an increasing part of the creation of new wealth’56 while 
‘outsiders’ represent ‘the vast majority of people who… are excluded from 
[these sectors] as well as from the education which prepares people for 
them’.57 The EU would have to guarantee high-quality lifelong critical, 
dialectical and cooperative education based on experimentation58 en-
54  Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘A falsa escolha e uma falsa solução’ Observador (24 June 2016) 
<http://observador.pt/opiniao/a-falsa-escolha-e-uma-falsa-solucao/> accessed 1 Novem-
ber 2018.
55  Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Left Alternative (Verso 2005) 92-93.
56  ibid, 89.
57  ibid.
58  Ibid, 92-93.
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abling the individual to be fl exible on the job market and ‘to participate 
in a form of production that increasingly becomes a practice of collective 
learning and pertinent innovation’. Similarly, Alexander Somek has ar-
gued that ‘[i]t is essential… that a European Union reverses its perverse 
federalist make-up. The current combination of free movement confl ict-
ing with nationally-conceived social welfare systems is a recipe for polit-
ical disaster’.59
What comes to the mind of most scholars and practitioners working 
in the fi eld of European law in reaction to these ideas of Bartl, Kukovec, 
Unger and Somek is that the EU has no competence for these radical 
changes, and that the Treaties are clear on the objective of creating an 
internal market. However, we would ask the reader to keep in mind that 
Treaty texts can never be entirely clear, and also that all treaties can 
be changed. The European Union needs imagination to think of better 
solutions. Furthermore, the multifaceted crisis which the EU is facing 
requires us to revisit even some of its basic assumptions. 
3 Inadequacies in the political process and outcomes
For a long period, the EU has been trying to tackle the attitude of 
‘blame it on Brussels’ by doing more to inform its citizens about some 
positive developments in EU law and policy, both by making various doc-
uments available online as well as by making its activities understand-
able and accessible to citizens. However, it seems to us that there is now-
adays a more globally present movement to ‘blame it on the government’. 
This sentiment has been sweeping over many voting blocs across the 
globe and breeds populism. Those most affected by populist movements 
are those who are economic losers, as mentioned above, and who also 
feel they have little to no political power.  
We have seen growing distrust of government generally. In the US, 
we have observed a rise in distrust of Washington. The last three pres-
idential candidates have run as Washington outsiders. Whether or not 
it was true, Bush represented the simple American, Obama was young 
with a new hope, and Trump − possibly the pinnacle of this phenomenon 
− had never been in politics and seems to purposefully reject political 
norms. Even competitive, but ultimately unsuccessful, candidates of the 
last elections attempted to position themselves in the same way. McCain 
was a ‘maverick’, Bernie Sanders was an outsider with a different voice. 
However, in reality, both of these men were elected to the House of Rep-
resentatives in 1982 and 1990 respectively and had each been serving in 
the Senate for several terms. 
59  Somek (n 12) 107.
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These elections show that Americans felt left out of the political dis-
cussion and decision-making process. A good and highly relevant exam-
ple is the impressions of politics of Rust Belt voters.60 The Rust Belt be-
gins in central New York and traverses west through Pennsylvania, West 
Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, and the lower peninsula of Michigan, ending in 
northern Illinois, eastern Iowa, and southeastern Wisconsin. Voters from 
this area regularly play a signifi cant role in presidential elections. 
At the height of the industrial age, the Rust Belt’s political and eco-
nomic battle was between factory owners and union leaders. The col-
lapse in the manufacturing industry and a signifi cant increase in big 
business mergers have meant job losses but also the end of locally owned 
industries and local labour unions fi ghting those industries. According 
to Josh Pacewicz, an adjunct professor at Brown University, this ‘left 
communities vulnerable to the whims of corporate subsidiaries and state 
and nonprofi t grant-making agencies, which was often communities’ 
only way to fi nd discretionary funding’.61 This means that the communi-
ty leaders were constantly dealing with people outside the community. In 
2008, a voter told Pacewicz:
We got a lot more retail [and cultural amenities, but] these things don’t 
appeal to your average person. . . . We used to have factory jobs, but peo-
ple had to settle for Walmart. We got businesses coming in with their 
money and saying, ‘Your city wants it!’ That’s not democracy — that’s 
communism.62 
While the voter has incorrectly used the term communism per-
haps because he has confl ated that concept with authoritarian rule, he 
seems to be strongly opposing the government in determining what is 
best for the people of his town without seeking their opinion. This is the 
type of person that ‘blames it on Washington’. Not only has he been left 
out economically, but he is also not involved in the political discourse. 
He feels politically disenfranchised and has experienced an economic 
downturn. 
In the industrial revolution, the petite bourgeoisie experienced a 
similar phenomenon. The changing economy left the storekeepers, large 
60  This was the topic of Donald Regan’s keynote speech ‘What Accounts for the Recent Rise 
of “Populism” in the US and the EU?’ at the 15th annual Jean Monnet seminar on advanced 
issues of EU law (Inter University Centre, Dubrovnik, April 2017), and his ideas have fed 
into our own reasoning. 
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farm owners, and small-scale merchants behind as people fl ocked to 
the cities. Many authors, such as RJB Bosworth63 and Wilhelm Reich,64 
believe the economic change and the fall of the petite bourgeoisie made 
them disassociate from the haute bourgeoisie, feel powerless, leading to 
their support of populism and, in turn, of fascism.
There are people who are economic winners, but still feel like politi-
cal outsiders. Just before the keynote talk on which this editorial note is 
based, one of us met a young woman named Julia. Julia is a 29-year-old 
Austrian program developer in the gaming industry.65 Like a growing 
number of Europeans, Julia is sceptical of EU government institutions. 
‘They are going to do what they want’, she said about EU politicians and 
bureaucrats. Julia personifi es the idea of ‘blame it on Brussels’ which 
she says creates too many regulations − even though she is not sure 
what those regulations are. She knows that information is available, but 
it is not accessible in a way that makes it easy for her to understand. 
She feels the process as a whole is out of her control. In the Information 
Age, this feeling of disenfranchisement has increased. Citizens feel they 
should be able to access and interact with decision-makers thanks to 
the capabilities of the internet, but instead the internet is constantly 
showing them how little infl uence they have on governmental policies. 
When asked if she thought the Austrian parliament was more respon-
sive, she stated she felt disconnected to that as well, but was much more 
optimistic. Even considering the difference in her opinions about the two 
governments, she was adamant that if given the choice she would vote 
against Austria leaving the EU. 
Voter turnout is a crucial indicator of whether citizens feel their 
participation matters. According to the 2016 report by the Internation-
al Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance on Voter Turnout 
Worldwide, there has been a 10% decline in voter turnout for European 
national parliamentary elections since 1980.66 However there has been 
nearly a 20% decline in voter turnout for EU parliamentary elections.67 
In fact, the average voter turnout in EU national parliaments in the last 
election was 63%, while the EU parliamentary election had a voter turn-
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out of 43%.68 So while we see a general move away from engagement with 
governments, at the EU level this is more severe. 
For decades, social scientists have stated that participatory deci-
sion-making processes make those affected by the decision feel better 
about the outcome. A study of tort litigants showed that satisfaction with 
decisions was less related to objective outcomes and costs than to per-
ceptions of whether the procedure met the litigants’ criteria of fairness 
− especially if they felt their story had been heard.69 While Julia is not 
an economic loser − in fact she is in a growing industry − she feels like 
a political outsider who is not heard and in turn is unable to infl uence 
those who make decisions that govern her life. If she were an economic 
loser, imagine to what extent she might ‘blame it on Brussels’! 
Alexander Somek points out that the reaction of some liberals to 
growing populism is that ‘[t]he people are bearable only if mitigated by 
means of representation’.70 And Somek rhetorically asks, ‘Is this really 
the attitude with which you win the hearts and minds of disaffected or-
dinary folk?’71 His, and my, answer is no. Not only is this idea of mitigat-
ing the power of these ‘stupid’ people illiberal, it plays into the very fear 
that motivates them. In this way, it is short sighted. As some of the more 
populist political leaders have found, these people should be embraced, 
not pushed away. It is a tool that can be used by both the right and the 
left. Theodore Roosevelt, a US President relatively to the left, the creator 
of the American social system, was renowned for speaking directly to the 
people in a simple way through his ‘fi reside chats’.
Therefore, as we look ahead at what is probably just the very begin-
ning of the digital revolution and the resulting economic displacement 
wrapped in sentiments of disenfranchisement, we must not fi ght the 
people who have been attracted to populist trope, but rather work to 
create systems that make people adaptable to the new economic mar-
ket realities and, more than that, make the political and legal deci-
sion-making process not only more transparent, but actually more ac-
cessible to all.
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4 Final remarks 
 For the future of European integration, it is vital for the EU to ad-
dress two questions. First, how much inequality can be attributed to 
the effects of law in the current set-up of the EU system (ie can Brussels 
or Luxembourg be blamed for it) or, instead, is inequality the result of 
different causes (eg globalisation, technical progress)? Second, what can 
the EU do to address inequalities resulting from EU integration or from 
other causes, and to make the positive sides of integration, including its 
contribution to equality, more visible to citizens? These questions are 
part of a global trend and many governments worldwide are facing sim-
ilar discussions. 
